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Abstract
We present a novel method for generating robust adver-
sarial image examples building upon the recent ‘deep image
prior’ (DIP) that exploits convolutional network architec-
tures to enforce plausible texture in image synthesis. Adver-
sarial images are commonly generated by perturbing images
to introduce high frequency noise that induces image mis-
classification, but that is fragile to subsequent digital manip-
ulation of the image. We show that using DIP to reconstruct
an image under adversarial constraint induces perturbations
that are more robust to affine deformation, whilst remaining
visually imperceptible. Furthermore we show that our DIP
approach can also be adapted to produce local adversarial
patches (‘adversarial stickers’). We demonstrate robust ad-
versarial examples over a broad gamut of images and object
classes drawn from the ImageNet dataset.
1. Introduction
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are known to
be vulnerable to adversarial examples; inputs that exhibit
marginal visual difference from the distribution of correctly
classified images but cause dramatically different classifi-
cation decisions [20, 9]. These ‘adversarial images’ may
be crafted to attack an a priori trained network, via back-
propagation of gradients to induce pixel-level perturbations
of a target image either globally [20, 9, 15, 2] or within a
restricted local region (‘adversarial stickers’ [1, 6]) in or-
der to nudge the classification outcome over the decision
boundary. The enthusiastic adoption of neural networks e.g.
for autonomous vehicles and robotics opens a new facet of
cyber-security, motivated on one hand to train networks re-
silient to such attacks, and on the other to evaluate resilience
by developing new attacks.
The contribution of this paper is a new algorithm for syn-
thesizing adversarial image examples that exhibit equal or
better robustness to image deformation than contemporary
methods, whilst maintaining low perceptibility to a human
observer. Currently adversarial image attacks are limited in
their scope and real-world applicability due to either their
fragility or the perceptibility of the perturbations introduced
to the target image. The perturbations typically induced to
generate an adversarial image manifest as high-frequency
noise (see Fig. 1). The capacity of perturbations to induce
misclassification is thus greatly attenuated by simple image
deformations such as re-sampling under affine transforma-
tion, which are inherent in any eventual manifestation of
an attack ‘in the wild’. Furthermore, high-frequency arti-
facts are readily detectable by the human visual system so
revealing the presence of attacks.
In this work we explore an alternative method for gen-
erating covert adversarial image examples, leveraging the
recently proposed ‘Deep Image Prior’ (DIP) for image re-
construction [22]. The surprising result of DIP is that the
statistics of natural images can be encoded through a CNN ar-
chitecture; i.e. the CNN structure rather than actual weights
of the filters. The translation equivariance of CNNs enables
DIP to exploit the internal recurrence of visual texture in
images [12], in a similar way as the classical non-parametric
patch based approaches to texture synthesis [8]. Under DIP
an image is reconstructed by training a deep encoder-decoder
CNN from scratch (random weights) to overfit a reconstruc-
tion loss function for that single image. Our core technical
contribution is to frame adversarial image synthesis as a re-
construction problem, leveraging the DIP to reconstruct an
image from a randomly initialized (white noise) image under
a dual reconstruction and adversarial loss. Reconstructing
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Figure 1. Overview: We propose a reconstruction-based approach to synthesising adversarial image attacks using DIP (middle) that
produces images more resilient to affine transformation without human perceptible artifacts vs. the original image (left) than state of the art
adversarial image attacks e.g. Carlini and Wagner [2] (right).
the image under this constraint affords greater flexibility
for perturbation across the whole image, in contrast to ex-
isting methods that rely upon backpropagation to update
pixel values from a local minimum (the initial target image).
The resulting perturbations are regularized by the DIP to re-
semble the appearance of natural images, further mitigating
against sporadic high frequency noise patterns characteristic
of adversarial images. Our reconstruction framework can be
used to induce perturbations within the whole image, that
are hard to perceive yet exhibit superior robustness to affine
transformation than state of the art adversarial image algo-
rithms. Further we show that our method can also be adapted
to restrict perturbations to a local region of interest resulting
in adversarial stickers that are competitive with the state of
the art at inducing misclassification.
2. Related Work
Adversarial attacks on deep networks for visual recog-
nition have received significant attention in recent years,
prompted by the step change in performance delivered by
CNNs across diverse object classes [10, 19]. Szegedy et
al. pioneered adversarial attacks for visual classifiers [20],
demonstrating that minor perturbations of pixel values can
induce significant CNN misclassification rates despite lit-
tle human perceptible visual difference. Goodfellow et al.
demonstrated linearity of this effect in input space, intro-
ducing the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [9] to quickly
compute adversarial perturbations via backpropagation with-
out need for solving costly optimizations. An iterative form
of this method for more robust attacks was later presented
[11]. DeepFool [15] explictly optimises to minimise percep-
tibility and maximise robustness in order to form adversarial
examples. Carlini and Wagner optimise for similar goals
using alternative norms [2]. All of the above induce high
frequency noise within the whole image with limited human
perceptibility. Whilst the attacks are covert they are also
fragile to image resampling e.g. due to image transformation
or printing. Adversarial patches take a complementary, overt
approach via synthesis of vivid ‘stickers’ [1] that occupy
only a small region yet induce misclassification [1, 6] or
misdetection [3, 21]. Such approaches are reminiscent of
attacks against classical facial detection algorithms [7, 18] in
that they can be physically manifested for real-world deploy-
ment. Nevertheless, like whole image methods, such stickers
are sensitive to affine transformation limiting their use in
practical attacks [13] for the time being. Like prior work,
we take an optimization approach but uniquely leverage an
encoder-decoder network and Deep Image Prior (DIP) [22]
to reconstruct the attack image from scratch incorporating
an adversarial constraint. The latitude afforded by this recon-
struction mitigates the introduction of sporadic noise which
both improves robustness and limits perceptibly of attacks.
Whilst our focus is on whole image covert attack our method
can also be adapted to synthesise overt attacks via adversarial
patches.
3. Methodology
Let f : Rm → {1, . . . , l} be a CNN classifier taking im-
age pixel values and returning an object class label, and let
J f : Rm×{1, . . . , l} → R+ be its associated loss function.
For an image x ∈ Rm we aim to find a small perturbation
r ∈ Rm such that f (x+ r) 6= f (x). We say that x+ r is an
adversarial image. If we pick a class c ∈ {1, . . . , l} and aim
to get f (x+ r) = c then we say the adversarial example is
targeted, and if not we say it is untargeted. We let Pf (x)
be the output probabilities of the classifier, and we also let
Z f (x) be the output to the logits layer of the classifier. For
consistency, subscripts to indicate the components of vectors,
and bracketed superscripts to indicate iterations, i.e. xi is the
ith component of x and x(i) is the ith iteration of x.
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Figure 2. Proposed architecture for adversarial image generation via image reconstruction (DIP). Model Gθ (.) is trained on single target
image x to map N 7→ (x+ r) such that f (x+ r) 6= f (x) for pre-trained target CNN (the subject of the attack) under dual loss (6) comprising
reconstruction and adversarial loss terms.
We motivate our method by first briefly recapping fast
gradient methods which create minor image perturbations
via a short (ε) linear jump in the input domain determined
via backpropagation through f :
r = ε
∇xJ f (x,y)
‖∇xJ f (x,y)‖ . (1)
We try to choose ε as small as possible such that the attack
is still effective. A popular and fast approximation (FGSM)
due to Goodfellow et al. [9] is to set r = ε sign(∇xJ f (x,y)).
A piece-wise linear extension of FGSM [11] is to perform
FGSM iteratively in the hope of obtaining a successful ad-
versarial example without having to make ε large. More
concretely, we set r(0) = 0, and then for t > 0 we have
r(t+1) = r(t)+α sign
(
∇xJ f
(
x+ r(t),y
))
(2)
where the α = ε/T for T the number of iterations. The mo-
mentum iterative method [5] adds a momentum term to this
basic iterative method in order to escape from local minima.
As before we set r(0) = 0 but also g(0) = 0. Now for t > 0
we iterate using:
g(t+1) = µg(t)+
∇xJ f (x+ r(t),y)
‖∇xJ f (x+ r(t),y)‖1
(3)
r(t+1) = r(t)+α sign(g(t+1)) (4)
where µ is a decay factor that degenerates to the basic itera-
tive method as t increases.
3.1. Adversarial Images via DIP Reconstruction
The disadvantage of FGSM and derivative methods is
their dependence upon backpropagation to perturb the im-
age from a local minima (x). Despite mitigation strategies
(e.g. momentum) all tend to converge to an r composed of
high frequency speckle noise (c.f. Fig. 3) which presents
a trade-off between visibility (high ε) and fragility (low ε).
We therefore propose an alternative to these local methods,
leveraging the recently proposed Deep Image Prior (DIP)
[22] to synthesise x+r via global image reconstruction, such
that f (x+ r) 6= f (x).
The core idea is to learn a generative CNN Gθ (where θ
are the network parameters) to reconstruct x from a noise
map N of identical height and width to x, with pixels drawn
from a uniform random distribution. We use a symmetric
encoder-decoder network architecture with skip connections
(Fig. 2) for Gθ , comprising five (up-)convolutional layers
with filter size 3×3 and 128 en/decoder channels per layer,
skip connections between all layer pairings. Ulyanov et al.
originally proposed a reconstruction loss to learn Gθ for
image restoration applications such as denoising, in-painting
and super-resolution:
θ ∗ = argmin
θ
‖Gθ (N)− x‖22 (5)
where ‖.‖2 is the L2 norm. In practice the generator Gθ
provides implicit regularisation via the structure of the CNN
in lieu of an explicit regularisation in the loss (e.g. total
variation loss [14]). Whilst Gθ is under-constrained, its
output converges faster to natural images than to unnatural
ones, thus DIP provides a useful reconstruction prior.
We propose an alternative, dual term loss function to learn
θ to synthesise Gθ (N) = x+ r that both approximates and
misclassifies x:
θ ∗ = argmin
θ (t)
J f (Gθ (t)(N),y)+λ‖Gθ (t)(N)− x‖22 (6)
where in our work λ = 10−5 balances the order of magnitude
of the adversarial (first) and reconstruction (second) terms,
and θ (t) indicates network weights at iteration t of training.
We train to overfit θ to x via the Adam optimizer yielding the
adversarial perturbation r=Gθ∗(N)−x. We explore popular
CNN configurations for { f ,J f } to attack in subsec. 4.2.
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Arch. Method None Rot-S Rot-L Scale-S Scale-L JPEG
VGG
DIP (Ours) 1.00 0.97 0.45 0.99 0.65 0.63
FGSM-IterL [11] 1.00 0.99 0.76 1.00 0.84 0.99
FGSM-IterS [11] 1.00 0.53 0.07 0.79 0.11 0.11
L-BFGS [20] 1.00 0.45 0.05 0.78 0.08 0.06
SMM [16] 0.59 0.26 0.04 0.37 0.07 0.10
C&W [2] 1.00 0.37 0.05 0.65 0.07 0.07
DeepFool [15] 0.98 0.87 0.37 0.94 0.48 0.57
GNet
DIP (Ours) 0.93 0.91 0.59 0.92 0.79 0.71
FGSM-IterL [11] 0.88 0.87 0.72 0.88 0.79 0.86
FGSM-IterS [11] 0.75 0.39 0.22 0.49 0.25 0.23
L-BFGS [20] 0.98 0.40 0.07 0.71 0.11 0.07
SMM [16] 0.25 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.05
C&W [2] 0.99 0.34 0.07 0.55 0.10 0.07
DeepFool [15] 0.98 0.77 0.40 0.86 0.53 0.45
Table 1. Misclassification rate induced by attack for all methods and architectures trained over ImageNet, for several affine transformations.
Note FGSM-IterL is an overt attack (FGSM with large ε) for comparison.
Baseline Ours Less Visible No Difference Ours More Visible
FGSM-IterL [11] 0.76 0.16 0.08
FGSM-IterS [11] 0.14 0.50 0.36
L-BFGS [20] 0.14 0.52 0.34
SMM [16] 0.24 0.52 0.24
C&W [2] 0.17 0.05 0.78
DeepFool [15] 0.04 0.37 0.59
Table 2. Perceptibility study. Quantifying visibility of perturbations due to our DIP method vs. baselines; values indicate fraction of response
in which our method has less, equally, or more visible artifacts vs. a baseline method (over 100 classes).
Method FGSM-IterS FGSM-IterL L-BFGS SMM C&W DeepFool Ours
Time(m) 0.10 0.02 2.88 0.72 1.87 0.02 4.49
Table 3. Time taken to generate adversarial image examples for all methods.
3.1.1 Local patch based attack
Our method can optionally be adapted to an overt attack, in
which an adversarial patch is synthesised and composited
into a region of an image in order to induce misclassifica-
tion. We define a region of interest (ROI) via binary mask
M ∈ [0,1]. In this case we seek perturbation r to create a
composite image xˆ = x+ r(t):
xˆ = MGθ (t)(N)+(1−M) x (7)
where  is element-wise multiplication. We optimize as
before, but without any reconstruction constraint in the loss:
θ ∗ = argmin
θ (t)
J f (xˆ,y). (8)
A single adversarial patch capable of attacking multiple
images (similar to the adversarial stickers of Brown et al.
[1]) can be created by sampling x in mini-batches from a set
of training images (versus learning θ over a single image, as
in the whole image case). We evaluate the performance of
such stickers in subsec. 4.3.
4. Evaluation and Discussion
We evaluate the performance of our method in terms of its
efficacy and robustness against affine image transformation,
and the perceptibility of artifacts introduced into the covert
adversarial image examples created.
4.1. Experimental Setup
We evaluate our approach against 6 baselines (sub-
sec.4.1.1) over 2 popular architectures: VGG-19 and
GoogLeNet Inception v3 trained using ImageNet [4] and
evaluate on a test set of 1000 images (hereafter, ImageNet-
TS1K) comprising a random image sampled from each cate-
gory in the ImageNet test partition. We evaluate the success
rate, defined as the fraction of target images in which the
method induces an incorrect classification decision. For
covert attacks we also determine the perceptibility of in-
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Figure 3. Representative perturbations (r) our proposed method vs. baselines running on two target images x; normalised and gamma
corrected for visibility. In practice all the perturbations except FGSMIter-L are non- or barely perceptible.
duced image artifacts via user study on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) using a randomly sampled 10% of the test
set (hereafter, ImageNet-TS100) for practicality. We present
the original image alongside the perturbed images from our
technique and a baseline (in random order) and ask which
is closer to the original. Each triplet is presented five times
(each to independent MTurkers); in total 500 annotations are
collected for the perceptual user study.
4.1.1 Baseline Methods
Our baselines are momentum iterative FGSM [5] with
small (-S) and large (-L) parameter choices for ε . For the
former we pick the smallest ε that the attack is effective
(i.e. inducing minimal perturbation). For the latter we pick
a constant large value (0.1). Four contemporary methods
(below) are also evaluated. Open implementations from
Rauber et al.’s Foolbox [17] are used for all baselines.
L-BFGS. Szegedy et al.’s method [20] uses L-
BFGS search to generate adversarial examples by
finding minimum (d > 0) such that the r minimis-
ing ‖r‖2 + dJ f (x,c) subject to x + r ∈ [0,1]m satisfies
f (x+ r) = c.
Carlini & Wagner (C&W) use a binary search to choose
the smallest d > 0 for which the solution w to the problem
minimise ‖h(w)− x‖22+dg(h(w)) (9)
satisfies f (h(w)) = c; where g is defined as
g
(
x′
)
= max
{
max
{
Z f
(
x′
)
i : i 6= c
}
−Z f
(
x′
)
c ,−κ
}
, (10)
h(w) = 1/2(tanh(w)+1), and κ ≥ 0 is a parameter that
can guarantee a desired confidence. Then our adversarial
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Figure 4. Characterising the robustness of the proposed method for whole image attack to affine image transformation; rotation (a,c), scaling
(b,d) over ImageNet trained VGG-19 (a,b) and GoogLeNetv3 (c,d) models. Our method degrades more gracefully than contemporary
baselines.
example is x+ r = 1/2(tanh(w)+1).
Saliency Map Method (SMM) Papernot et al. differentiate
the softmax output Pf (or in another variant, the logits Z f )
and apply a saliency map to this derivative, to target features
to perturb. A typical example of a saliency map would be to
choose two pixels (p1, p2):
(p1, p2) = argmin
(p1,p2)
−
(
∑
i=p1,p2
∂
(
Pf
)
t
∂xi
)
×
(
∑
i=p1,p2
∑
j 6=t
∂
(
Pf
)
j
∂xi
)
(11)
where t is the target class and we only consider (p1, p2)
for which the first term in (11) is positive and the second
negative.
DeepFool [15] finds optimal adversarial examples for the
case of an affine classifier. To apply this to a general classifier
we iteratively linearise it. Begin by setting x(0) = 0. We
continue the following procedure until we achieve a change
of class, i.e. it is an untargeted attack. For every i∈ {}, t > 0
we define
wi,t = ∇Pf
(
x(t)
)
i
−∇Pf
(
x(t)
)
f (x)
(12)
vi,t = Pf
(
x(t)
)
i
−Pf
(
x(t)
)
f (x)
(13)
k = argmin
i6= f (x)
|vi,t |
‖wi,t‖2 (14)
x(t+1) = x(t)+
|vi,t |
‖wi,t‖22
wk,t (15)
and stop when f
(
x(t)
)
6= f (x).
4.2. Evaluating Adversarial Images
We quantify success rate of our proposed DIP method
against baselines in Tbl. 1. All methods run as targetted at-
tacks; for each image in ImageNet-TS1K we pick a random
incorrect class to define J f (.) over softmax loss in CNN f
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Figure 5. Adversarial patch attack: Ours (subsec. 3.1.1) vs. Brown et al. [1]. Left: Plotting misclassification rate vs. size of patch for
VGG-19 and GoogLeNetv3; Control line (red) indicates success rate of super-imposing a photographic patch of target object. Successful
patch attacks by us (middle) and Brown et al. [1] (right).
and penalise deviation from a one-hot vector for that incor-
rect class under MSE loss. The exception is DeepFool which
as proposed in [15] defined J f (.) as an untargetted attack,
using MSE loss from a negated one-hot vector for the correct
class. We test robustness to five image transformations (plus
no transformation). Specifically we test recompressing the
image as JPEG with 80% quality, or scale the image by up to
1± .005 (-L) and 1± .001 (-S), or rotate it by up to ±.5 (-L)
and ±.1 (-S) degrees. For all transformations and networks
our method is significantly more robust than other covert
baseline, observing by more graceful decay in success rate
(Fig. 4). The exception is FGSM-IterL which we include
an example of an overt attack, forcing highly visible image
perturbations by setting ε high. This represents an indicative
level of overtness that FGSM needs to perform at to match
the barely visible perturbations of our method. We provide
visual examples of r (enhanced via normalization) in Fig. 3,
and include results from our MTurk evaluation of attack vis-
ibility over ImageNet-TS100 (Tbl. 2). In all but two cases
the perturbations via our method are less visible, or there
is no visible preference, to baselines. The exceptions are
DeepFool and C&W. Minor loss of high frequency detail
inherent in DIP reconstruction may influences responses.
Finally we compare run-time speed of our method to base-
lines in Tbl.3. Our approach takes a few minutes to run per
image, relatively slow but comparable to state of the art opti-
mization approaches [20, 2] running on a NVIDIA 1080Ti
GPU. The non-deterministic nature of DIP yields slightly
different adversarial examples each run, however we found
no significant performance difference between runs.
4.3. Evaluating Adversarial Patches
We evaluate the adaptation of our method (subsec. 3.1.1)
to create adversarial patches for an overt targetted attack,
comparing to Brown et al.’s Adversarial Stickers [1] (Fig. 5).
We pick a random ‘attack’ class and generate a sticker us-
ing 999 training images (one per ImageNet class, holding
out the attack class) sampled randomly from the ImageNet
training partition. We then apply that single sticker to all
ImageNet-TS1K excluding the attack class, and consider
the misclassification rate by applying to sticker to a random
location. The process is averaged over 10 random attack
classes. The sticker is scaled to a proportion of image area
(see plot, Fig. 5). We find our method performs similarly to
Brown et al. [1] outperforming the control case of pasting a
large image of the attack class into the image. We train on
VGG and GNet to enable comparison to [1] but also com-
pare application of the GNet trained patches to attack a VGG
network; our method performs similarly beyond 0.25.
5. Conclusion
We proposed a novel algorithm for the generation of
covert adversarial image examples. Leveraging DIP to re-
construct the image from scratch under dual reconstruction
and adversarial loss avoids the introduction of fragile high
frequency artifacts. The resulting adversarial image exhibits
greater robustness to affine image warping than the state
of the art methods [20, 9, 2, 15, 16] whilst exhibiting low
human visual perceptibility. We showed the same framework
can be adapted to synthesise adversarial patches with similar
performance to the state of the art sticker attack [1]. We
demonstrated successful attacks against popular CNN visual
classification networks (VGG-19, GoogLeNet Inception v3)
using diverse categories from ImageNet. Future work could
further characterise other networks and datasets, however
we do not feel such enhancements necessary to demonstrate
the promise of our adversarial image synthesis using image
reconstruction under DIP.
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